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4 
“The Source of 
Change Within 
Society”: A 









The politics of gender have dominated 
Western conversation concerning Iran since 
the Islamic Republic’s founding more than 
three decades ago. Often, this conversation 
centers on the veil and other aspects of 
Iranian women’s dress as a symbol of 
Iranian women’s inability for self-advocacy. 
Women, though, occupy a rich space in 
modern Iranian history. Beginning with the 
Tobacco Boycott of 1890 and ensuing 
Constitutional Revolution, following to the 
1936 unveiling law and the 1963 White 
Revolution, women’s rights were central to 
the Pahlavi regime’s modernization plans. 
These plans utilized a Western, humanist 
discourse that proved inimical to the 
fulfillment of women’s participation in the 
public sphere and presented female 
enfranchisement as immoral and dangerous 
to Iranian society. The time following the 
1979 Islamic Revolution opened doors to 
women’s activists to make use of Islamic 
                                                 
1 http://www.boredpanda.com/iranian-women-
fashion-1970-before-islamic-revolution-iran/ 
and Islamist discourse to further their 
political goals for equal rights. In this paper 
I examine the 1890 Tobacco Boycott and 
Constitutional Revolution, the 1936 
unveiling law, 1963 White Revolution, and 
1979 Islamic Revolution to present a brief 
history of women’s movements in Iran, trace 
the changing forms of discourse, and 
demonstrate how the Islamic Revolution 
opened the doors for Iranian women to 
develop an indigenous feminism that could 
not be characterized as immoral, dangerous, 
or Western.  
 
 
The politics of gender have dominated 
Western conversation concerning Iran since 
the Islamic Republic’s founding more than 
three decades ago. In the West, one regularly 
discovers articles 1  lamenting the apparent 
slide backwards that the Islamic Republic has 
taken with regards to women’s rights. 
Certainly, contemporary life for Iranian 
women is problematic. However, as Lila 
Abu-Lughod has noted, obsessive focus on 
the symbolic markers of women’s oppression 
(often clothing) in the Middle East tends to 
lead one into an Orientalist and essentialist 
trap that wipes away any understanding of 
Iranian women’s agency in their own lives: 
“Is it not a gross violation of women's own 
understandings of what they are doing to 
simply denounce the burqa as a medieval 
imposition?”2   
In reality, Iranian women, from the 
early twentieth century to the years following 
the 1979 revolution, have interacted with 
state and society in varied, complex ways, 
sometimes successfully and sometimes 
unsuccessfully, in an attempt to achieve 
gender equality. In this paper I will examine 
the history of women’s movements in Iran. I 
2 Abug-Lughod, 785 
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will first focus on pre-revolutionary history. 
Through the lens of three major events: the 
Tobacco Boycott and Constitutional 
Revolution, Reza Shah’s 1936 unveiling law, 
and Mohammed Reza Shah’s 1963 White 
Revolution, I will demonstrate how the use of 
a Western, secular, humanist discourse 
surrounding female emancipation both failed 
to provide legitimate gender equality and 
served to reinforce clerical and traditional 
views of women’s emancipation as 
dangerous to the fabric of Iranian society. I 
will then examine the Islamic revolution and 
its aftermaths. Specifically, I will show that 
Islamist revolutionaries moralized women’s 
political participation in the public sphere 
and thus allowed Islamist women, in the 
decades following the revolution, to develop 
an emancipatory framework that is founded 
in a feminist exegesis of the Quran; what is 
known as Islamic feminism.  
The history of modern women’s 
action in Iran begins with the Tobacco 
Boycott of 1890 and ensuing Constitutional 
Revolution. In both cases women proved 
invaluable, lending concrete physical support 
to the boycott and the constitutional 
movement. Unfortunately, the Constitutional 
Revolution also marked the beginning of a 
construction, in the Iranian national 
consciousness, of both women’s 
emancipation and female political 
participation as immoral, corrupting, and 
Western. This construction was further 
reinforced during the Pahlavi dynasty, when 
programs of rapid modernization and 
Westernization, in which the appearance of 
gender equality was considered critical, were 
instituted.  
The Pahlavis introduced two legal 
packages, the 1936 unveiling law and 1963 
White Revolution, which, superficially, 
attempted to allow space for women to 
integrate into, and engage with, the public 
political sphere. Ultimately, though, the laws 
                                                 
3 Ahmadi, 35 
failed to achieve their stated aim. Women’s 
emancipation, as a component of the Pahlavis’ 
plan for Westernization and modernization, 
was derided as immoral and dangerous to 
Iranian society. The problem, as I identify in 
this paper, was primarily discursive: the 
Pahlavi dynasty and those women activists 
who worked within its institutional confines 
made use of a modern, Western mode of 
discourse, which could not adequately 
challenge the traditional, Islamic discourse of 
the clerical establishment and those who 
opposed women’s emancipation. This 
changed quite drastically during the 1979 
Islamic Revolution.  
The revolution, in which female 
revolutionaries were lionized by the highest 
religious figures, opened the doors of Islamic 
discourse to women; especially with regards 
to women’s rights and female emancipation. 
Certain women, after the revolution, made 
use of the new, Islamic mode of discourse to 
push for and develop what some scholars 
have called Islamic Feminism, that is: “a 
feminist discourse and practice articulated 
within an Islamic Paradigm.” 3  They have 
made use of classic, Islamic, theological tools, 
such as ijtihad, or interpretation, to 
reinterpret and reclaim Islam and Quranic 
verses as feminist.  
From the Tobacco Boycott of 1890 
until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian 
women on the front lines of progressive 
social and political movements aimed at 
securing gender equality and developing a 
feminist consciousness. These movements 
took the form of mass protests, in the case of 
the Tobacco Boycott and Constitutional 
Revolution or top-down political action, in 
the case of the 1936 unveiling laws and 1963 
White Revolution. These movements, 
whether broad-based or top-down, attempted 
to institute a secular, humanist, and, most 
importantly, Western interpretation of gender 
equality. Unfortunately, the use of a Western, 
5
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secular, humanist discourse surrounding 
female emancipation both failed to provide 
legitimate gender equality and served to 
reinforce clerical and traditionalist views of 
women’s emancipation as dangerous to the 
very fabric of Iranian society.  
Several of the ideas outlined above 
are rather slippery and, for the purposes of 
this paper, will require more nuanced and in-
depth definitions, namely: my delineation of 
legitimate equality and the broader idea of a 
Western, secular, feminist politics. First, I 
consider a legitimate policy of gender 
equality to be one that is both legal (i.e. 
enshrined in law) and reflected, or visible, 
within broader society. Thus, a movement 
which advocates for gender equality and 
which may be supported by a majority of 
people is illegitimate if it does not rest on a 
political and legal foundation of equality; that 
is, if legal code does not support gender 
equality. Conversely, if a legal and political 
movement is not supported in society at large, 
it too is illegitimate. This is not meant as a 
critique of attempts to build gender equality 
either through law or through social 
movements; rather, as will shortly become 
clear, it is a necessary definition in 
understanding the history and development 
of feminist consciousness in Iran.  
Secondly, a Western, secular feminist 
discourse is one that takes a humanist 
approach in justifying female empowerment 
and gender equality. This approach takes as 
self-evident that women and men deserve 
equal treatment and are equally capable of 
participating in society; it was forcefully 
articulated by Zayneb Pasha, a female leader 
in the Tobacco Boycott of 1890: “If you men 
do not have the courage to punish the 
oppressors…wear our veil and go home. Do 
not claim to be men; we will fight instead of 
you.” 4  That is, if men are unable to 
                                                 
4 Vakil, 27 
5 Paidar, 43 
6  Derayeh, 111 
accomplish the necessary goals of fighting 
tyranny they should allow women to take 
charge because women are equally capable; 
men and women are intrinsically equal.  
 Returning to Iran, in 1890 the Shah of 
Iran at the time, Nasser al-Din, granted a 
concession over all Iranian tobacco to Great 
Britain, which led to widespread protests that 
cut across social, class, and gender lines 
within the country. Despite attempts to keep 
them a secret, word of the concessions got out 
to the general public and, supported in part by 
edicts from clergy and leaders outside Iran, a 
broad swath of the Iranian public took to the 
streets in protest. The protests were 
unprecedented but not unexpected: Western 
business had been encroaching into the 
Iranian economy for some time. While these 
encroachments sometimes brought 
prosperity to Iranian businessmen, they more 
often transformed traditional economic 
structures and ruined native industries. 5 
Quite naturally, then, Western intrusion into 
the Iranian economic sphere was met with 
anger and resentment, which quickly evolved 
into a broader rejection of Western 
philosophical and social values, including 
women’s emancipation.  
Women played a key role in the 
Tobacco protests; when the protests first 
erupted, women immediately joined in, 
marching in organized lines at the front of the 
crowds. 6  As the protests evolved into a 
general boycott on the consumption and sale 
of tobacco, women’s groups, known as 
anjomans, turned militant. They armed 
themselves with “rifles, clubs, and bags full 
of rocks, hidden under their black chadors7 
and attacked merchants and soldiers who 
refused to support the boycott. Surprisingly, 
even the Shah’s wives “stood in solidarity 
with ordinary Iranians in boycotting 
tobacco.” 8  Faced with opposition from all 
7  Derayeh, 111 
8 Vakil, 27 
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sides of society, the Shah had little choice but 
to cancel the tobacco concession—Iranians 
and, especially Iranian women, had been 
successful. In leading protests and in 
militantly upholding the boycott, Iranian 
women recognized the power they held to 
effect change. The Iranian women on the 
front lines of the Tobacco Boycott 
represented a burgeoning understanding of 
women’s social and political strength; a 
growth in feminist consciousness in Iran. 
Understandably, women soon acted upon this 
consciousness to advocate for domestic 
political change during the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1905-1911.  
 With the success of the Tobacco 
Boycott grew a greater nationalist and anti-
imperialist sentiment, culminating in the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. 
Women, once again, fought on the front lines. 
Initially, as with the Tobacco Boycott, 
anjomans joined forces with members of 
disparate social classes to push for the 
general goals of constitutionalism, checks 
and balances, and an Iranian society free of 
despotism. As the revolution proceeded, 
though, militant anjomans, reminiscent of 
those in of the Tobacco Boycott, took up 
arms in support of the movement. Some 
“took up clubs and acted as bodyguards”9 for 
prominent clergy members who supported 
the constitution, while others went so far as 
to enter government buildings with revolvers 
and threaten to “kill their own husbands and 
sons and leave behind their own dead 
bodies” 10  if constitutionalism was not 
enacted. As in the Tobacco Boycotts, the 
Shah was forced to concede: in 1906, a 
constitution was drafted that severely 
curtailed the monarch’s power. It would seem 
that women had again successfully 
demonstrated their collective ability to enact 
political change. Unfortunately, while 
                                                 
9 Derayeh, 114 
10 Vakil, 27 
11 Paidar, 57 
women who had fought and died for the 
constitutionalist cause were honored as 
“martyrs of freedom,”11 female participation 
in the revolution was not materially rewarded: 
the constitution “completely ignored and 
omitted rights for women;” 12  they were 
barred from voting, from running for office, 
and even from acquiring education. 
Constitutionalist women were incensed: 
women “did not take part in the Revolution 
to have their rights trampled upon.”13  
Despite their anger, in the years 
following the revolution, as disagreements 
over constitutionalism and the future of the 
country evolved into an outright civil war, 
women remained explicitly nationalist and 
constitutionalist. Women financed, 
supported, and again took up arms for the 
constitutionalist cause, for the most part 
without crossing into expressly emancipatory 
territory. Those who did practice an 
emancipatory politics, who advocated for the 
radical ideals of women’s education, 
women’s suffrage, or release from veiling 
laws, were castigated. In one particularly 
memorable moment, a group of women took 
to the streets of Tehran shouting pro-
constitutional slogans and removing their 
chadors. Their actions immediately resulted 
in public indignation: the anti-veil protestors 
were condemned, even by other 
constitutionalist women; their actions 
derided as those of “a bunch of prostitutes.14 
Thus, while women were celebrated as 
“martyrs of freedom” while strictly fighting 
for a patriarchal constitution, they were 
castigated, pilloried as immoral prostitutes, 
and dismissed the moment they began to 
advocate for a personal emancipation.  
The failure of the Constitutional 
Revolution to achieve legitimate gender 
equality was primarily one of differing 
discourses: radical anjomans had pushed for 
12 Derayeh, 115 
13 Paidar, 55 
14  Paidar, 59 
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equality through humanist arguments, by 
declaring that women were intrinsically able 
to “correct the law… and appoint 
governors… [and] destroy the roots of 
tyranny and oppression” 15 , but opposition 
relied on religious and Islamic arguments to 
outline the impossibility of such equality. 
Arguments against women’s rights were 
presented by clerics who argued that “God 
had not given them [women] the capacity 
needed for taking part in politics.”16 In the 
cultural and discursive environment of the 
time, defined by a growing distrust of all 
Western ideals due to Western economic 
disruption in the previous decades, the 
traditional, religious argument was stronger 
than the humanist one: women’s place in 
Iranian society was ordained by God himself. 
The Constitutional Revolution and its 
aftermath demonstrated the inadequacy of 
humanist approaches to achieving gender 
equality in Iran; there was simply no way to 
develop a broad-based, modern, secular 
movement for women’s rights in the face of 
popular opposition that viewed female 
emancipators as “prostitutes”; that 
considered all emancipatory action the result 
of a “conspiracy of ‘morally corrupt’ 
Westernized intellectuals”17, as one cleric put 
it, to destroy Iranian society. Despite this 
failure, future emancipatory action remained 
situated within a Western, secular discourse. 
However, further attempts, as in 1936, to 
develop women’s emancipation within such 
a Western discourse were resoundingly 
rejected by the traditional and clerical classes.  
 In 1936, Reza Shah unilaterally 
banned the use of the veil. The ban was 
delivered as part of a broader push towards a 
Western modernity, as such the policy failed 
to secure legitimate female emancipation and, 
                                                 
15 Derayeh, 115 
16 Vakil, 29 
17 Paidar, 67 
18 Paidar, 81 
19 Keddie, 100 
in fact, isolated a large segment of Iranian 
women from society while further 
constructing women’s emancipation as 
Western and immoral.  
 From the outset of his rule, Reza 
Shah maintained a strict policy of nation 
building and modernization that was built on 
a specific conception of modernity that held 
as paramount the “imitation of certain aspects 
of Western societies.”18  To that end, taxes 
were imposed, railroads and factories were 
built, and the military was greatly expanded. 
With regards to women, the Shah believed 
the visible entrance of women into the public 
sphere was “a hallmark of modernization.”19 
Following a trip to Turkey in the early 1930s, 
where Ataturk had already banned hijab, the 
Shah unilaterally barred the use of the veil 
among Iranian women and ordered them to 
dress in “Western-style clothing.” 20  The 
policy was militantly enforced: women who 
ventured outside wearing a veil were liable to 
be attacked and forcibly disrobed by police.21  
While the policy could be construed 
as an attempt to emancipate women, this was 
belied by the Shah’s decision to, at the time 
of the law’s passage, dismantle all 
independent women’s organizations, 
women’s magazines, and women’s 
newspapers that existed in Iran. 22  The 
unveiling policy was enacted strictly to force 
a rapid Westernization of Iran, not 
emancipate women. Although the Shah’s 
new policy was supported by some middle 
and upper-class women, leaving the house 
unveiled was, for the many lower-class and 
religious women who had been socialized to 
accept the veil as natural, akin to going out 
naked. 23  Facing state violence if they 
disobeyed, following Reza Shah’s decree 
many of these religious women simply 
20 Keddie, 100 
21 Keddie, 100 
22 Paidar, 102 
23 Keddie, 100 
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refused to leave their homes. While the 
Shah’s unveiling policy was, in theory, aimed 
at drawing women visibly into the public 
sphere, in practice it did the exact opposite. 
Furthermore, the law underscored and 
reinforced the general feeling that the West 
was the source of moral decay in Iran. A 
cleric named Ruhollah Khomeini best put 
feeling into words: “the dishonorable act of 
unveiling… inflicted moral and material 
damage on our country and is forbidden by 
the law of God and the Prophet”.24 The 1936 
law, then, did two things: first, the Shah’s 
dismantlement of female civic society and 
the women’s spaces compounded with the 
social reality of Iran at the time, where the 
veil was understood as natural, moral, and 
religious, led to the exclusion of a large 
majority of Iranian women from the public 
sphere. Second, the law reinforced 
underlying assumptions about the immorality 
of the West and the connection between such 
immorality and women’s emancipation. It 
did not achieve legitimate gender equality. 
The law’s failure can be read as a failure of 
Western-style humanism to justify the 
perceived immorality of unveiling; that is, the 
law failed precisely because it imitated 
Western norms. A similar pattern emerged in 
later years, as Reza Shah’s son, Mohammed 
Reza Shah, pursued female suffrage in 1963.   
 In the years following the 1936 
unveiling law, Iran was wracked by various 
political and social events: World War Two 
brought foreign dominance to Iran; Reza 
Shah was deposed, his son, Mohammed Reza 
Shah, was installed; the early fifties saw the 
rise of a populist, democratic nationalist in 
the form of Mohammed Mossadeq, who was 
promptly ousted by a cadre of royalists and 
CIA agents. In the wake of the Mossadeq 
affair, Mohammed Reza Shah began to 
                                                 
24 Paidar, 121 
25 See Axworthy for a general history of pre-
revolutionary Iran. 
26 Keddie, 144 
consolidate his own political power, 
developing a brutal internal intelligence 
service, SAVAK, and tightening his grip over 
Iran. Mohammed Reza Shah also worked to 
extend his father’s program of Western-style 
modernization, and in 1963 instituted a series 
of reforms, known as the White Revolution, 
which included female suffrage among its 
provisions.25  
 The 1963 White Revolution was, 
without a doubt, a deeply significant moment 
for women’s history in Iran. The legal gains 
made through the Revolution represented a 
leap forward in terms of women’s political 
and legal recognition in Iran. This said, 
despite the Revolution’s positive effects, the 
enactment of female suffrage failed to alter 
social conceptions of women’s emancipation 
as an immoral encroachment by the West into 
Iranian society.  
 In January 1963, specifically in 
response to American “reform pressures”26, 
Mohammed Reza Shah announced that he 
would put to referendum a six-point program 
of social reform, entitled the White 
Revolution, which included the extension of 
the right to vote to women. The Pahlavi 
government’s connection to the United States 
was well recognized in Iran at the time. 27 
Unsurprisingly then, the clerical 
establishment was vehemently opposed to the 
White Revolution and the referendum, 
calling its supporters “the enemies of 
Islam,” 28  yet again invoking a connection 
between Westernization and destruction of 
traditional, Islamic society. Clerical 
opposition was, ostensibly, tied to issues of 
dictatorship and “subservience to Western 
Powers.”29  However, one would be remiss 
not to acknowledge the importance of 
women’s suffrage as a point of contention 
among Iranian clerics at the time: just a year 
27 Keddie, 144 
28 Paidar, 145 
29 Keddie, 146 
9
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before the Revolution was launched, 
Ruhollah Khomeini had privately warned the 
prime minister that “the franchise of 
women… is contrary to Islam.”30 Despite the 
opposition, the referendum, “like most such 
referendums” 31  at the time, passed with a 
massive majority.32  
The rather explicit merging of 
subservience to the United States and 
women’s suffrage incensed the religious and 
traditional sectors of society. In a further 
response to the passage of the White 
Revolution, Khomeini began to preach 
against the Shah, instigating a protest 
movement that “included thousands of clergy, 
shopkeepers, office workers, teachers and 
students.” 33  The Pahlavi regime responded 
violently, leading to the death of hundreds of 
individuals. 34  While it was claimed that a 
majority of Iranians supported the White 
Revolution, a sizable and broad swath of 
society, clearly, did not. The discourse of 
modernization that the Pahlavi regime 
championed, once again, was unable to 
engender public support or challenge 
religious discourse that held women’s 
suffrage to be “contrary to Islam”. Thus, 
while the White Revolution did secure 
women’s suffrage, it did so at the cost of 
alienating large amounts of the population 
and cementing the connection between 
women’s emancipation, immorality, and the 
West in the minds of ordinary Iranians.  
 By the waning years of the Pahlavi 
dynasty, political action had failed to achieve 
wide social acceptance of women’s 
emancipation or legitimate social equality. 
These failures were primarily discursive: 
Iranian women’s action had been structured 
within a secular, humanist discourse, inimical 
to traditional society, which was further 
compounded by the efforts of the Pahlavis 
                                                 
30 Paidar, 143 
31  Keddie, 145 
32 Derayeh, 150 
33 Paidar, 146 
elder and junior to tie female emancipation to 
their program of modernization and 
Westernization. Specifically, the 1936 
unveiling law and 1963 White Revolution 
both used women’s emancipation as a tool 
towards greater Westernization of society. 
Thus, in a sort of self-perpetuating cycle, 
emancipatory political action under the 
Pahlavis failed to create legitimate equality 
because it was considered intimately tied to 
the West and at the same time served to 
further the conception of emancipation as 
corrupting, immoral, and Western. This 
concept was perhaps best captured by Jal 
Ale-Ahmad’s popular and influential essay, 
Gharbzadegi, which viewed the end-result of 
the Pahlavis’ emancipatory politics as the 
gharbzadegi, or Westoxicated, woman: a 
“super-consumerist” who was a “propagator 
of the corrupt culture of the West”; a culture 
which was actively “undermining the moral 
fabric of society.” 35  But, precisely because 
the clerical establishment saw the Pahlavi-
supported emancipation of women as 
immoral and dangerous, when the 
opportunity arose for revolutionary action, 
Islamists chose to champion the cause of 
“true” women’s rights, dramatically altering 
the valence of women’s political action 
during and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  
In 1978, widespread, anti-Shah 
protests erupted across Iran. The protests, 
which quickly evolved into a full-scale 
revolution, involved the large and active 
participation of women. In fact, up to a third 
of the demonstrators in the revolution were 
women;36 a figure made more impressive by 
the fact that many of the demonstrations and 
protests numbered in the millions. 37  While 
leadership of the revolutionary movement 
was confined, generally, to radical, Islamist, 
men, like Khomeini (who had, by the time of 
34 Keddie, 147 
35 Paidar 213 
36 Halper, 104 
37 Keddie, 231 
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the revolution, come to be known as 
Ayatollah Khomeini) women were free to 
participate in any other aspects of the struggle 
that they wished to take up. Women took part 
in both peaceful and violent protests; dug 
trenches, fought in street battles; and joined 
guerrilla movements, strikes, and boycotts.38 
Perhaps most importantly, women acted as a 
motivational foundation to the greater 
revolutionary movement: supporting friends 
and family; working as doctors and nurses; 
cooking; and spreading “oppositional 
literature and tapes.”39 Women, from the start 
of the revolution, were active in nearly all 
levels of the public landscape of protests and 
demonstrations.  
 As the revolution continued, 
women’s participation increasingly came to 
represent an Islamist view. This happened for 
two reasons. First, as the revolutions 
proceeded, “those opposed to the shah’s 
regime increasingly saw as bad everything 
the regime saw as good.”40 The regime had 
long championed secularism, Westernization, 
and modernization. Logically, to register 
opposition to the regime and its immoral 
politics, women chose to embrace Islam and 
traditionalism. Second, secular, leftist, or 
otherwise moderate revolutionary elements 
refused to take up the question of women’s 
rights “because of its association with the 
policies of the Shah’s regime.”41 But radical, 
Islamist elements, precisely because they 
considered women to be “victims of the 
Shah’s [immoral] regime,” 42  believed they 
had the duty of advancing women’s true 
interests. Islamists explicitly pointed to 
“women as the source of change within 
society.”43 Thus, women increasingly chose 
to don the chador and hijab,44 which became 
the physical symbol of the rejection of 
                                                 
38 Paidar, 211 
39 Paidar, 212 
40 Keddie, 229 
41 Paidar, 210 
42 Paidar, 218 
Pahlavi values, in effect transforming 
religious garb into powerful, anti-Shah 
political symbols. Female activists during the 
revolution, then, were both voicing anger 
with the Western, corrupting, and immoral 
gender policies of the Shah and pragmatically 
aligning themselves with the only 
revolutionary elements, Islamists, who 
promised to further women’s rights and 
gender equality.  
 The result of the alignment between 
Islamists and women was profound: women 
were lionized and their political participation 
sanctioned as divinely moral by the highest 
organs of the Shii’a establishment. Islamist 
leaders unconditionally approved of 
women’s participation in the revolution; 
Khomeini called women’s involvement “one 
of the blessings of [the revolutionary] 
movement”, 45  and exclaimed that women 
were serving the revolutionary cause in a 
manner that exceeded that of men. 46  The 
Islamists transformed female political action 
from its pre-revolutionary construction as 
Western and immoral, into a decidedly moral, 
Islamic act. The effects were immediately 
obvious: during the revolution, large 
numbers of women “disobey[ed] their 
husbands and fathers on political grounds,”47 
left the house, and felt able to mix and 
demonstrate politically alongside 
revolutionary men. The reconstruction of 
female political action as moral, though, had 
much farther reaching consequences: it 
allowed women to challenge gender 
oppression within a discourse that the new, 
post-revolutionary Islamic Republic had to 
engage with; that is, sanctification of 
women’s political action as Islamic meant 
that emancipatory women, unlike in the 
Pahlavi days, could access a religious and 
43 Paidar, 210 
44 Keddie, 230 
45 Halper, 108 
46 Halper, 107 
47 Paidar, 218 
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traditional discourse that resonated with the 
population and government and which could 
not be brushed aside as Western or corrupt: 
women’s political action was, as Khomeini 
had decreed during the revolution, entirely 
moral.  
 Immediately following the ouster of 
the Shah, Khomeini and other Islamists 
carefully purged the new Republic of all 
secular opposition. In a series of impressive 
political moves, Khomeini took power; 
clerics, for the first time, were in control of 
both the religious and political 
establishments of Iran. Paradoxically, the 
result of clerical control over political 
structures was the creation of a constitution 
that represented a “total reversal of the 
history of clerical opposition to women’s 
participation in the economy, politics and 
society.”48 To retain the large, female support 
it had enjoyed during the revolution, the new 
Islamist regime enshrined women’s right to 
political participation in the Islamic republic. 
However, within several years the regime’s 
professed commitments to gender equality 
were severely curtailed.  
Immediately following the institution 
of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the new 
government walked back its apparent 
commitment to women during the revolution, 
instituting mandatory hijab; purging secular 
women from government; and reinstituting 
shari’a with regards to family law.49 The new 
regime, though, had, in the constitution, 
enshrined women’s right to political 
participation; Khomeini could not ignore the 
legal and moral space women now occupied 
in the public, political sphere. Thus, Islamist 
women, faced with the regressive gender 
policies which the Islamic Republic was 
championing, were able to engage the 
                                                 
48 Paidar, 257 
49 Halper, 110 
50 Halper, 112 
51 Halper, 120 
52 Halper, 120 
religious establishment of the state in 
dialogue, presenting “female-centered 
interpretations of Islam;” 50  advocating for 
woman-friendly laws. The state, to remain 
credible as both the political and religious 
supremacy in Iran, had to respond; cite 
authoritative religious and legal sources; 
offer rationalizations and proofs.51 In doing 
so, the state and Islamist women created what 
legal scholar Louise Halper calls a “process 
of public engagement,”52 a national dialogue 
with which the Islamist regime was required 
to engage to remain credible as a religious 
and political authority. This national dialogue 
further legitimized the political actions of 
Islamist women. 
The result of this public engagement 
was a slew of successes for Iranian women. 
Due to the political agitation of Islamist 
women, by the early 1990s, “restrictive 
barriers to women’s educational achievement 
and their employment were removed;” 53 
regressive family laws were repealed and, 
surpassing any laws of the Pahlavi regime, a 
new law to compensate divorced wives for 
housework, was passed.54 Bolstered by their 
political successes, Islamist women in the 
early nineties began to build a formalized, 
feminist exegesis of the Quran.  
Islamist women, making use of the 
moralized space that the Islamic Revolution 
opened for female political actors, built a 
movement that can be described as “Islamic 
feminist.” 55 This movement was primarily 
promulgated through a single female 
publication: Zanan, a popular women’s 
magazine.56  Zanan hosted a mix of articles 
concerning “religion, culture, law, and 
education,”57 but by far the most important 
topic it has covered with regards to feminism 
is that of ijtihad, independent reasoning and 
53 Moghadam, 1140 
54 Halper, 100 
55 Moghadam, 1140 
56 Moghadam, 1144 
57 Moghadam, 1144 
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the right to reinterpretation of the Quran. 
Islamic feminists rely on ijtihad, a common 
practice among Shi’a mullahs, to advance a 
“feminist rereading of the sacred texts.”58 In 
doing so, Islamic feminists draw upon the 
explicitly religious and moralized public 
space that the revolution created, engaging 
with the discourse of Islam that the revolution 
brought to Iran. More importantly, though, 
reinterpretation of the Quran represents a 
radical reclaiming of what was once a system 
of oppression. In reclaiming the Quran, 
Islamic feminists assert the goals and needs 
of women in Iran while also remaining within 
the bounds of their faith. Islamic feminism, 
then, is both a rejection of the Western values, 
so despised during the Pahlavi years, and a 
rejection of Orientalist constructions of the 
Islamic woman as utterly oppressed and 
lacking agency. It is an entirely indigenous 
form of feminism, owned and articulated by 
Iranian women. 
Beginning with the Tobacco Boycott 
and Constitutional Revolution of 1905 until 
the early 1990s, women and the politics of 
gender have been on the forefront of the 
Iranian national consciousness. In the 
Tobacco Boycott and Constitutional 
Revolution, women first demonstrated 
political and organizational power. 
Unfortunately, the two events also catalyzed 
clerical opposition to women’s rights as an 
immoral and corrupting Western influence 
that had no place in Iran. Thus, despite their 
valiant efforts, women were not given an 
equal treatment in the constitution of 1906. 
Further efforts to emancipate women came as 
part of a state-controlled march towards 
Western modernity during the Pahlavi 
dynasty. Both Pahlavis, elder and junior, 
believed that the appearance of women’s 
emancipation was necessary in order to 
achieve a desired, Western modernity in Iran. 
However, Reza Shah Pahlavi’s unveiling law 
served to alienate the vast majority of Iranian 
                                                 
58 Ahmadi, 36 
women, as well the country’s clerical 
establishment, from the regime’s goal of 
Western modernity, while concurrently 
dismantling all arms of the independent 
women’s movement in the country—
isolating women in their homes and barring 
them from public participation. Likewise, 
Mohammed Reza Shah’s 1963 White 
Revolution, of which women’s suffrage was 
a crucial component, brought harsh clerical 
opposition, in part due to the widely 
understood catalysis of the White Revolution 
from Western pressure. The end result of the 
Pahlavi attempts at modernization was both 
the construction in the public imaginary of 
the Westoxicated59 woman, a corrupt woman 
who was destroying the moral and material 
fabric of Iranian society, and the 
galvanization of the clerical establishment to 
redefine women’s political participation in 
Islamic terms during the 1979 revolution.  
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 
opened new allowed women to engage with 
traditional Iran within a common, religious 
discourse. During the revolution, women’s 
political participation was encouraged by 
Islamist revolutionaries. Despite earlier 
opposition to women’s suffrage and political 
participation, during the revolution clerical 
leaders sanctioned female participation as 
moral and divine. After the revolution, the 
Islamic government had to engage with 
religious, political women precisely because 
it had already approved of their political 
identities. Thus, in the face of the eradication 
of protective laws, women were able to 
advocate for themselves and push through 
procedural and legal changes that afforded 
them rights equal to those under the Shah by 
1992. 
The lionization and approval of 
women’s political and religious action in 
post-revolutionary Iran allowed some women 
to engage in a constructive reinterpretation of 
the Quran throughout the early 1990s. This 
59 Paidar, 213 
13
et al.: Full Issue
Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2018
 Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2018 
 
14
new, feminist exegesis posited that the Quran 
is a living text, which can and should be 
understood through a temporal lens, allowing 
for the development of what some scholars 
have called an “Islamic feminism,” or a 
feminism that holds as crucial its connection 
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This paper addresses the negative impacts 
that the current crisis in Syria has had on 
childhood and education. The research 
conducted for this paper is a compilation of 
scholarly articles, books, reports, and films; 
the diversity allows for a multiplicity of 
perspectives on the topic. A thorough 
background is provided as the groundwork 
to understand the shift from development to 
retrogression in Syria. An analysis of the 
diversity of effects include: educational, 
social, psychological, emotional, and 
personal. Research includes the 
interventions, conducted by both 
international and national actors, of 
schooling and social integration within and 
outside of the Syrian borders. In thoroughly 
analyzing the way violence influences the 
accessibility and quality of schooling that a 
child receives, as well as the way 
resettlement and integration impact a child, 
it is concluded that the current interventions 




- Asylum seekers: refugees who seek 
to remain in the country to which they flee 
- IDP: internally displaced persons; 
individuals forced to leave certain parts of 
their country and who are now displaced 
within their own borders 
- Refugee: those who are forced to 
leave their homeland, or who leave 
involuntarily, out of fear for personal safety. 
- Childhood: a stage of development 
often characterized by play and school; a 
period of time where children are still 
“innocent;” a stage that can be redefined by 
circumstances, such as war and violence 
- Ba’ath: the ruling political party in 
Syria  
- Bashar al-Assad: President of Syria  
- Militarization: began in response to 
the regime’s brutal response to protests, 
resulting in the increased violence present 
today 
- Political Islam(ists): Muslims who 
are politically active and who believe that a 
Muslim government is the only way to rule 
- al-Qaeda: Islamist militant group; 
cellular, terrorist organization that focuses 
on local/national conflicts to the degree that 
they are manifestations of a global struggle  
- ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; 
jihadist militant group  
- Free Syrian Army: FSA; composed 
of defectors from the Syrian army who are 
fighting against the regime 
- Aleppo: city in Northern Syria that 
has become a site of conflict 
- Refugee Camps: camps in receiving 
countries where refugees can settle prior to 
obtaining legal status or settling in future 
homes; services such as medical aid and 
schooling are offered and organized 
typically by INGOs and local NGOs 
- Resettlement: the process by which 
refugees have sought asylum and are 
relocated and admitted to a state different 
from their own for permanent settlement  
- (Re) integration: the social process 
by which refugees transition/assimilate into 
the receiving country and into “normalcy”  
- Lost generation: the younger 
generation of Syrians who are maturing 
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during the heightened conflict and who bear 
the greatest burden of the conflict 
- Political quietism: opposite of 
political Islam; withdrawing from political 




This paper is on Syrian children and the 
effects of the war on the educational system. 
Syria’s education system has undergone 
reform and many crises over the past 
seventy years, including but not limited to: 
reforms in curriculum, consolidation, war, 
and destruction. The impacts of the reforms 
and crises have clearly inhibited the 
development of Syria’s educational 
structure. Additionally, within the past 
decade, because of the instability that has 
festered within Syria, the educational 
services have all but halted. The little 
schooling that is available to the Syrian 
children is high risk and of low quality. 
Over 50% of the children in the population 
are not receiving any sort of education.  
Without quality schooling, any chance of 
reaching full potential and creating a sense 
of normalcy is not possible. This increases 
the likelihood that these children will 
become a “lost generation,” or a generation 
that cannot self-actualize because of its 
unstable circumstances. The resettlement 
process in Syria and outside countries has 
also influenced the children who are trying 
to (re)integrate into society, while also 
experiencing social, psychological, and 
emotional tolls that the crisis has imposed 
on them. Fortunately, there are several 
different interventions underway mostly run 
by relief groups, umbrella organizations, 
volunteers, and school systems in the new 
countries, etc. However, when the war ends 
                                                 
60 Mansel, Philip. Aleppo: The Rise and Fall of 
Syria's Great Merchant City. London: I.B. Tauris & 
Co. Ltd, 2016. 
61 Ibid 
more intervention will be needed for the 
purposes of rebuilding the country. 
In this paper, I will be discussing the effects 
that the current conflict and resettlement 
processes have had on Syrian children. My 
research is based on the question of: how the 
legal status of an individual affects her/his 
access to education and childhood 
experience, specifically when they are 
within or from an area of conflict. This 
paper will provide sections on the 





Syria’s History of a Nation and Education 
System 
The background to the Syrian conflict in 
relation to this paper begins in the 20th 
century. The Post-Mandate Period, which 
lasted from 1944-1963, was characterized by 
mass mobilization and nationalism. In 
January of 1944 Syria gained independence 
from the twenty-years of the French 
Mandate rule. However the French troops 
who were occupying Syria at the time did 
not leave until April of 1946.60  
Syria’s Golden Years follow the France’s 
departure. The 1950s were filled with 
economic reforms where the elite class 
flourished, while the poor grew more 
disgruntled. Aleppo became a center for 
tourism; the city was characterized by the 
increasing wealth and status of those who 
visited.61 In terms of the political landscape, 
a landlord-merchant class dominated 
Syria.62 The Syrian Golden Years also 
included reforms driven by nationalism. 
These reforms concerned the educational 
system and were specifically geared towards 
a “nationalization” of education, a spirit that 
62 Abboud, Syria. 
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began during the Post Mandate Period. In 
1957, the Syrian government began taking 
control of the private schools. Private 
establishments could no longer appoint their 
own administrators and teachers nor could 
they set their tuition costs. The government 
moved towards collapsing the private sector 
into the public school sector arguing that the 
private schools needed to start bearing the 
costs of education. Following the increased 
control came the resignation of many of the 
original administrators and staff in the 
private school sector resulting in an increase 
in the government’s control. Evidently, this 
rise of government control, as well as the 
development of Syria’s economy were 
beneficial or “glorious” for Syria, but these 
years ended and there was an emergence of 
a new Syria that came after.63  
Ba’ath Emergence 
In 1963, the Ba’ath Party gained power 
following a “bloodless coup” (Abboud 
2016). The Post-1963 era was characterized 
by revolution, regime preservation, 
socialism, consolidation, and social 
mobilization. The Ba’ath Party was 
composed of civilian and military officers. 
The regime had the goal of radical social 
transformation. As the regime developed, 
Hafez Assad emerged; his rule was 
characterized as authoritarianism. Assad 
took control of all institutions minimizing 
political freedoms for the socially 
disadvantaged. The regime was run as a 
dynastic dictatorship, beginning with 
President Hafez al-Assad. They made an 
introduction to social welfare; however, it 
was only in exchange for political quietism. 
Additionally, the Assads promoted 
secularism. This exemplifies the way in 
                                                 
63 Alayan, Samira, Achim Rhode, and Sarhan 
Dhouib. The politics of education reform in the 
Middle East: self and other in textbooks and 
curricula. New York, NY: Berghahn, 2012.  
64 Mansel, Aleppo: The Rise and Fall of Syria's Great 
Merchant City. 
which the regime was looking to control 
every sector of society in order to strengthen 
its connection to the state.64  
Education Reforms 
In Syria, basic or primary education is a 
total of nine years, divided in two cycles. It 
is followed by secondary education, which 
lasts a total of three years. Post-Secondary 
education ranges between one and six years 
depending on the type of schooling, be it 
vocational school or doctoral school. The 
following graph outlines the division of 





In 1975, curriculum modifications began 
within the Ministry of Education in Syria, 
ranging from changes in curriculum to 
extending compulsory education. In the 
1990’s, an amending of each grade 
curriculum (within primary & secondary 
education) began. The amending process 
consisted of changing the curriculum at an 
average of one grade per year for grades 1-
12.65  
In 1981, education became compulsory for 
ages six to twelve. In 1997, the Ministry of 
Education added information sciences and 
foreign language to the curriculum.66  
In 2000, Bashar al-Assad assumed power, 
followed by a multitude of economic 
reforms motivated by neoliberalism in the 
attempt to create a social market economy. 
65 Alayan et al., The politics of education reform in 
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The premise of this type of economy is “to 
achieve social welfare through increasingly 
privatized and marketized mechanisms... 
[and] to rebalance public/private sector 
authority to encourage private business 
interests to play a larger role in the 
economy.”67  
Reforms in 2001 consisted of extending the 
amendment of compulsory education from 
ages six to twelve to ages six to sixteen. An 
additional regulation required students who 
were finishing their basic education to take 
an exam whereupon passing, they would 
obtain a certificate.68 The exam results and 
the certificate were meant to help students 
determine whether they should continue 
their education at a general secondary school 
or a vocational secondary school.69  
Further regulations were imposed on private 
schools in 2004. The Syrian government 
required they use the same textbooks that 
were used within the public school sector as 
a way of ensuring that the private schools 
did not develop at a faster rate than the 
public.70 This regulation limited the private 
schools’ overall development and serves as 
an example of the increasing governmental 
control over all institutions. This regulation 
also explains why only 3% of all primary 
schools in Syria are private and why only 
6% of all secondary schools are private.71 
Consolidating the private school sector, 
increasing control in institutions, and 
promoting a more sectarian society in Syria 
are all factors that contributed to the uproar 
in 2011.  
Syrian Spring 
Increased tensions could no longer be 
suppressed and conflict in Syria began. The 
turmoil cannot be attributed to one single 
                                                 
67 Abboud, Syria.  
68 Immerstein, Silje, and Sulaf Al-Shaikhly. 
"Education in Syria." WENR. April 4, 2016. 
Accessed March 2017. 
http://wenr.wes.org/2016/04/education-in-syria. 
factor, but rather by a buildup of several 
different causes. Economic dislocation, the 
spread of the Arab Spring, historical 
suppression of political opposition, inflation, 
and a culture of fear are all factors that 
increased tension and political disgust for 
the state of Syria.72 
In February of 2011, the protests in Syria 
began in Dar’a after the arrests and 
detention of fifteen middle school-aged boys 
spray painted, “the people want the downfall 
of the regime” on their school building. This 
phrase was the slogan for the Arab protests, 
serving as a symbol of political opposition. 
The regime detained the boys as a way of 
continuing their political suppression of 
opposition. As a response, Syrians took to 
the streets in protest. The movement gained 
momentum and by mid-March, it consumed 
much of Syria.73  
Division of Protesting Groups 
Initially, the movement was rather 
disorganized and disconnected. Protestors 
came from several different social and 
political backgrounds making it difficult for 
all of them to come together. Members of 
the secular, educated, and urban middle 
classes were heavily involved in the media 
and publicizing the protests. Kinship based 
networks or tribes were usually 
socioeconomically disadvantaged. These 
members were motivated by their social 
exclusion from the Ba’ath party; however, 
their strategy was unclear. Some tribes 
joined the regime, while others joined the 
opposition. Another group was made of 
political Islamists divided into several 
groups like ISIS, an-Nusra, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Additionally, the Free Syrian 
Army that formed is a more localized 
69 Alayan et al., The politics of education reform in 
the Middle East: self and other in textbooks and 
curricula. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Immerstein, Education in Syria. 
72 Abboud, Syria.  
73 Ibid. 
18
Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 2, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol2/iss4/1
 Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2018 
 
19
version of this group of protestors in that it 
consisted mainly of the local defectors of the 
regime’s army. A group of political and 
social activists also rose in opposition of the 
regime. Lastly, a group of the unemployed, 
marginalized, and urban subalterns 
protested. This group shared the 
socioeconomic and political grievances as 
other protestors, specifically because their 
disadvantages led them to experiencing the 
worst grievances first-hand.74  
Collaboration  
Despite the vast differences between these 
groups, they were able to organize and 
collaborate after they realized their common 
demands. These demands included a regime 
change, a new security apparatus, the 
resignation of al-Assad, an independent 
judiciary, and a new constitution. In having 
common demands, the protests became 
stronger, leaving the regime feeling 
threatened. As a result, the regime 
responded with repression. Their brutality 
led to the detainment and killing of 
protesters which in turn sparked the 
militarization of the movement. This 
trajectory led to the retreat of the Assad 
forces, which left Syria in the hands of rebel 
groups, gangs, and tribes. This fall of Syria 
provided an opportunity for the politically 
Islamist group, al-Qaeda, to take control. 
Groups like an-Nusra and ISIS joined forces 
with the long- suppressed political Islamists 
of Syria. The entry of these extremist and 
militarized groups contributed to the 
escalation of violence that has led Syria to 
its current situation.75 
 
Methodology 
Research for this project began in early 
March and was inspired after attending an 
event on campus. This event showed a 
Frontline movie titled “Children of Syria” 




and had an open discussion and opportunity 
to write letters to local legislation regarding 
the crisis in Syria.  Following the event, I 
returned home where I began my research.  
As I collected sources, I searched for those 
that would be most helpful to answering my 
research question, but also that were in the 
context of how the history and crisis in Syria 
can be looked at through the perspective of 
education, globalization, and childhood. My 
sources ranged from articles in journals 
focused on education or current issues, to 
books focused on the history of Syria, to 
anthologies on globalization, to media or 
video sources on Syria.  
After collecting these resources, I began to 
analyze it all and categorized them by 
“history,” “education,” and “interventions.” 
Within these categories, I have formed 
subcategories including nation’s history, 
educational history, education reform and 
systems, current events, interventions within 
educating children, resettling families, and 
reintegrating individuals.  
 
Findings 
When the conflict first began, many schools 
were still running and safely accessible. 
However, due to the rise in violence, 
damage to buildings, and increased 
displacement of students and teachers, the 
educational crisis became dire. Specifically, 
the infrastructural damage of school 
buildings has left the students who are still 
within borders with nowhere to go. A study 
performed in 2014 by the Syrian Center for 
Policy Research concluded that 25% of all 
schools stopped functioning, 600 were 
converted into IDP shelters, and 4,600 were 
completely destroyed. By the following 
year, an estimate of half of all school-aged 
children were no longer attending, 
approximately 3 million students.76 This 
76 Abboud, Syria. 
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number does not include refugee children, 
but it does serve as an example of how an 
entire Syrian generation is at risk.  
Fragmentation and Deprivation 
The Syrian conflict is generational, affecting 
the younger generations the most, both those 
in and out of the country. The conflict’s 
impact on education deprivation (within 
Syria) mirrors the fragmentation of the 
country. Northern cities like Aleppo and 
Raqqa are experiencing heavy levels of 
violence, while cities in the South are 
regime-controlled, such as Damascus and 
Homs. Consequently, regime-controlled 
areas are less likely to have levels of 
violence as high as the northern cities, which 
allows for safer environments and 
accessibility to education. Attendance rates 
in the North are estimated to be at 26-36%, 
while attendance rates in the South have 
increased. IDPs are drawn to the South to 
seek refuge, due to the lower violence rate 
and greater accessibility of services. The 
attendance rates demonstrate a strong 
correlation between the intensity of fighting 
and access to education. However, the rates 
also bring about another issue. While 
attendance rates are increasing in the South, 
the quality of education is decreasing. 
Greater population densities decrease the 
quality of social services available. 
Moreover, while IDPs are drawn to safer 
areas in the South, families are less likely to 
enroll their children in schools in fear that 
they will have to leave and find refuge 
elsewhere.77 Another preventative factor in 
school enrollment in conflict areas is that 
“[students] are now specifically being 
attacked and centers of learning have gone 
from being incidental victims to 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Labi, A. "Scholars in Danger Join World's 
Refugees." Chronicles of Higher Education 2014. 
79 Fazel, Mina, Ruth V. Reed, Catherine Panter-
Brick, and Alan Stein. "Mental health of displaced 
and refugee children resettled in high-income 
battlegrounds,” believing that streets are 
safer than schools.78 The deprivation of 
schooling that students face puts them far 
behind, making it difficult to find motivation 
to return to school when the opportunities 
comes, thus increasing the lost generation.  
Effects on the Psyche 
Not only has the war effected standard 
education, but it has also influenced 
personal childhoods. Children who live in 
war-torn areas of Syria, or experienced it 
prior to resettlement, have sustained social, 
psychological, and emotional effects that are 
lasting. Examples include cases of PTSD, 
depression, anxiety, and sleep deprivation. 
Additionally, children are forced to mature 
at an accelerated rate while living amongst 
so much destruction and change. The 
accelerated maturation tears a child’s 
innocence away, as they do not live in safe 
zones where playing and attending school 
are possible. Instead, children are living in 
fear. Studies in camps have gathered groups 
of children, asking how they have been 
affected by the crisis. More specifically, 
they were asked if they had ever 
experienced feelings of depression or 
thoughts of suicide to escape the atrocities 
that surround them. The results of this study 
showed that increasing amounts of children 
had indeed contemplated these actions. They 
also demonstrated a strong correlation 
between exposure to violence and trauma 
and symptoms of depression and PTSD.79 
Case Study: Children at risk 
Another area where parents are held 
accountable for effects of the war on their 
children is in cases of families who are 
supporting and fighting in the revolution. In 
a case study done in Aleppo, a family of 
countries: risk and protective factors." The 
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four (two parents, two young children) 
remained in the city where the father was 
fighting in the revolution, serving as an 
engineer and soldier. This left the children 
with no schooling and at extreme risk, as 
they lived in a neighborhood that was 
mostly destroyed and constantly under 
attack. Oftentimes, the children would go 
out carrying automatic weapons, scavenging 
for necessities in abandoned homes. Hearing 
explosions as they walked through the 
streets, they could identify what the 
explosion came from. The children would 
also occasionally help their father in making 
explosives. Given the circumstances of the 
conflict, the role of a parent is filled with 
harder decisions and actions that impact 
childhoods all the more. These facts and 
images are appalling and disturbing. Images 
of children, whose innocence is diminishing, 
walking through ruined roads, carrying 
weapons rather than books, with minds 
filled with fear rather than knowledge. This 
defines the lost generation. In this case 
study, the mother eventually resettled abroad 
with her children; however, this process of 
resettlement and integration was seemingly 
harder, given the uniquely horrid 
experiences of the children.80 
Issues of Resettlement 
Children undergoing the resettlement 
process in other countries are facing issues 
with integration. After witnessing and 
experiencing incredible human suffering, 
children and families are placed in 
communities where violence is not at the 
forefront. As a result, children struggle with 
reintegration into a normal society and 
everyday life where school and play are the 
focus, rather than survival. Children are 
faced with reconstructing their identity and 
                                                 
80 Frontline: Children of Syria, directed by Marcel 
Mettelsiefen. (2016; PBS: WTTW), DVD. 
 
finding what the rest of their childhood can 
entail.  
Interventions 
Schooling: Education is being received both 
in and out of the country; the interventions 
within Syria have taken creative forms. 
While low conflict areas are able to openly 
provide schooling for children, the areas 
drowning in conflict are pushed to taking a 
different approach. Several makeshift 
schools have been formed because of the 
destruction of buildings. Teachers and 
volunteers staff schools, in the form of 
underground caves, tents, trailers, tents and 
remaining building. The structure of 
classrooms has changed significantly 
because of the conflict, which has affected 
the way a child views schooling. The 
traditional classroom with desks, books, and 
a board in the front has transformed into 
children gathered on dirt floors, sharing 
textbooks in the dark as a teacher attempts to 
give a lesson. Additionally, an association 
has been made with the fear of educating 
one’s self. The classroom atmosphere is 
charged with the fear that death is lurking 
around the corner. Nonetheless, these 
makeshift schools have served students well, 
as they create a sense of normalcy for 
children whose lives are filled with fear. The 
schools are led by former teachers and 
activists who have been present since the 
beginning of the conflict, and their shared 
history with the children creates a sense of 
unity. In receiving schooling, a glimmer of 
hope remains and childhoods are 
preserved.81 
 The preservation of normalcy and 
childhood through education does not only 
occur within Syrian borders. Refugee camps 
in neighboring countries have also 
introduced schooling. In 2013, Jordan 
81 Sinclair, Margaret, "Education in emergencies," 
Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in 
Developing Countries, December 2001. 
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absorbed half a million refugees and 
Lebanon absorbed 800,000. However, 56% 
of Syrian children in Jordan and 80% of 
children in Lebanon were not enrolled in 
schools. Typically, schooling in refugee 
camps is organized and conducted by 
volunteers from NGOs, INGOs, and local 
volunteers within the camp or region, 
although not all volunteers are formally 
trained. Despite any flaws, the situation is 
one where having some form of school is 
better than none.82 
Reintegration Programs: In cases of 
resettlement, children need to be 
(re)integrated into society. Consequently, 
schools abroad have helped in forming co-
op programs to help children and families 
with the integration process and to decrease 
the social, linguistic, and cultural gaps 
experienced upon arrival. The programs 
cover language learning, communal 
development, multicultural inclusivity, and 
therapy; educators, administrators, social 
workers, and therapists create a well-
fostered and safe environment for the new 
students.83 Such interventions are more 
likely to produce stable resettlement and to 
create social support networks that 
positively impact a child’s psychological 
functioning.84 In Germany, this intervention 
leads schools “to support a learning process 
that promotes emotional maturity of 
students.” 85 
Programs focused on the care of students 
regard them as people first. This approach 
keeps in mind that students need their minds 
to be cared for first, given the multitude of 
negative experiences from the resettlement 
process. “Because emotional and 
psychological instability may affect the 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Timm, Marco. "The Integration of Refugees into 
the German Education System: A Stance for Cultural 
Pluralism and Multicultural Education," JEP: 
EJournal of Education Policy, 2016.  
cognitive development increasing their 
academic challenges, emotional and 
psychological well-being is a basic 
condition for meaningful engagement in 
learning.”86 The success of programs in 
Germany comes from the practice of 
fostering the well-being of their students, 
ensuring proper cognitive development to 




My research was inspired by “Children of 
Syria” film, leaving me curious about how 
the living conditions and legal status of an 
individual affects their childhood and 
education. Much of my research analyzes 
the lives of children and families living in 
and fleeing war zones. Given the sources I 
have come across, my findings have 
included multiple perspectives on the topic. 
While some sources contain focused case 
studies within a given part of Syria 
following a specific group, other resources 
have simply analyzed quantitative date.  
Because my research on the Syrian crisis is 
current, the quantitative data is constantly 
changing. In spite of this, it has been 
interesting to see how the numbers have 
changed progressively since 2011. For 
example, the number of displaced children 
and children not attending school cannot be 
exact for a number of reasons: there is no 
efficient or accurate way of obtaining exact 
numbers due to the constantly changing flow 
of people, and because there is no way of 
keeping track of so many individuals.  
The correlation of legal status and 
opportunity has come up in each resource. 
Whether a student is leaving the Syrian 
84 Sinclair, Learning for a Future: Refugee Education 
in Developing Countries. 
85 Timm, “The Integration of Refugees into the 
German Education System: A stance for Cultural 
Pluralism and Multiculturalism Education.” 
86 Ibid. 
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borders, or is travelling south in the country, 
their status as a refugee or IDP hinders their 
opportunity and access to education and a 
meaningful childhood. The status alone can 
put legal limitations on the individual in that 
they must be accepted into the country of 
resettlement. However, it can also limit a 
student in that the student is living in fear 
constantly. This fear can cause parents and 
children to be reluctant to enroll in school; 
they are fearful of the need to leave again or 
potentially being targeted by Islamist 
groups.  
Lastly, one particularly compelling finding 
is Syrian children’s motivation for obtaining 
education. The desire is engrained in the 
idea that education now can be used to 
rebuild the nation when the war is over. 
Whether the education is received within 
Syria or in neighboring countries in the 
West, the hope is to use that education as a 
building block in developing a new Syria. 
The fall of Syria as a nation will not be in 
vain if education is used as a tool of 




Given the current crisis in Syria and the 
multitude of effects it has had on children, 
interventions within education can be and 
are used as tools to keep a sense of normalcy 
amidst circumstances that are seemingly 
heinous. The Syrian nation’s risk of losing 
an entire generation to war has caused a dire 
educational crisis, while also eliciting an 
imperative need for the interventions in 
areas such as: makeshift schools, schooling 
in refugee camps, and integration programs 
in receiving countries. These programs and 
interventions serve as a barrier to the 
ignorance, despair, radicalization, and 
exploitation that Syrian children are 
                                                 
87 Ladika, Susan. "Empowering Refugees Through 
Education," International Educator, 2017, 26 (2): 32-
39. 
susceptible to because of the war. The 
findings made regarding the current 
interventions have revealed both positive 
and negative aspects as there are several 
gaps and flaws. Current interventions have 
shown determined efforts in ensuring 
education for children, as well as in creating 
safe environments that ease the resettlement 
process. However, a greater call to action 
and improvements can be made in order to 
fully ensure successful interventions that 
guarantee a better future for the Syrian 
people and the country itself.  
 
Agenda for Future Research 
 
 As stated in above, gaps and 
shortcomings are present within current 
interventions. In order to meet these 
shortcomings, future research would address 
the different possible approaches of future 
interventions, as well as necessary post-war 
interventions. To begin, there is clearly a 
low sense of urgency in implementing 
education efficiently within refugee camps. 
Much of the schooling that is organized is 
rather delayed, and the training for teachers 
and volunteers is rather minimal.88 This has 
created a call for greater urgency/efficiency 
and quality of education implemented in 
refugee camps. Assuming that when this 
future research is conducted, current 
interventions will have elevated to answer 
this call.  
 Room for improvement can be found 
in the need for cultural pluralism within 
integration programs. Although it exists in 
Germany in minute forms, a stronger bridge 
needs to be built that combines both native 
(Syrian) culture with host culture in order to 
create a deeper sense of belonging. Future 
findings might include this type of 
 
88 Sinclair, Learning for a Future: Refugee Education 
in Developing Countries 
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programming, considering that its current 
implementation is slowly developing.89 
 Another flaw can be found in the 
current psychological interventions. 
Although Germany currently has integration 
programs addressing the psyche in place, 
they need increased presence in other 
countries and to be treated as higher-
priority. An approach to be seen in future 
research would include the implementation 
of psychological interventions and 
programming prior to and alongside 
schooling. Adaptive systems that intersect 
the social, emotional, personal, and 
psychological aspects are needed so that 
individuals can cultivate their childhoods 
and educations. Without the proper 
implementation and care for a child’s 
psyche, cognitive and academic 
development will be limited, as the child 
experiences PTSD, depression, and anxiety, 
limiting their focus and drive for academic 
pursuit and success. An ideal methodology 
for future research would include a person-
first approach in interventions.  
 An additional path for future 
research would address how education is 
being used as a tool of empowerment. As 
noted in the Findings, education can be used 
as a way to rebuild Syria after the war is 
over. The country will have been left with 
very little infrastructure in multiple spheres. 
Therefore, the country as a whole will need 
to be rebuilt structurally, politically, 
economically, and socially from the bottom-
up. The demand for reconstruction will 
require a diversity of skilled and educated 
workers and professionals alike, hence the 
need for education now. The lost generation 
will need an education in order to become 
the successful founders of a new Syria, one 
united by a shared history with a common 
goal of renewal.  
                                                 
89 Timm, “The Integration of Refugees into the 
German Education System: A stance for Cultural 
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the Nile Perch 
into Lake 








The Nile perch (Lates niloticus) is often 
considered one of the worst invasive species 
on earth because of the damage it has done 
to Lake Victoria's ecology. Recently 
however the fish has been used as an export 
product and has become a significant source 
of revenue for fishing communities in the 
Lake Victoria Basin. The aim of this paper 
is to evaluate the introduction of the Nile 
perch into Lake Victoria through a political 
ecology perspective. In this paper we 
observe who the winners and losers are as a 
result of Nile perch introduction. The Nile 
perch has led to economic development 
however it has keep countries in the Lake 
Victoria Basin at the mercy of countries in 
the Global North most notably Europe 
leading to the continuation of a neo-colonial 
                                                 
90 The natural range of the Nile perch consists of 
Africa’s lakes: Turkana, Volta, Maryut, Chad, and 
the rivers: Niger, Senegal, Nile, and Congo. 
91 Robert M. Pringle. “The origins of the Nile perch 
in Lake Victoria.” BioScience, 55, no. 9 (2005): 782-
785. 
relationship. The paper further examines the 
implications that have resulted from the 
emergence of a hybrid ecology in Lake 
Victoria. 
 
I. The Nile Perch and its Introduction 
into Lake Victoria  
 
The Nile perch (Lates niloticus)90 grows 
up to six feet in length, weighs up to 440 
pounds, and has long been considered a 
menace to Africa’s Lake Victoria. In 1954, 
British colonial authorities under the 
Uganda Game and Fisheries Department 
introduced the fish into Lake Victoria with 
an intention to reduce the overfishing of 
tilapia, to release a fish similar to a 
prehistoric species that once lived in Lake 
Victoria, and to introduce a fish to prey on 
haplochromines (a tribe of cichlids endemic 
to eastern, northern, and southern Africa) in 
an attempt to develop the fishery’s 
profitability.91 The introduction of the fish 
caused a variety of unintended consequences 
that are seen today in the ecology of Lake 
Victoria, the traditional fishing communities 
of the Lake Victoria Basin (LVB), the 
governments who administer Lake Victoria, 
and Lake Victoria’s commercial fishery. The 
Nile perch is considered to be one of the 
world’s worst invasive species according to 
the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN).92 Despite the negative 
externalities resulting from Nile perch 
introduction a class of capitalist 
entrepreneurs have benefited from the 
species introduction. The largest benefactors 
from the introduction of the Nile perch are 
businesses based in the Global North that 
92 Sarah Lowe et al. 100 of the world's worst invasive 
alien species: a selection from the global invasive 
species database. Vol. 12. Auckland: Invasive 
Species Specialist Group, (2000): 6,11 
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import Nile perch at an inexpensive rate, 
most notably the European Union (EU).93 
This exploitation strengthens the core-
periphery relationship between Europe and 
Africa. The introduction of the Nile perch in 
Lake Victoria enhances economic and 
political power in the Global North, while 
simultaneously establishing a growing class 
of people in the LVB who lose in its wake. 
The individuals who are negatively affected 
are those in the Global South who are 
economically dependent on exporting the 
fish; which has fostered an unhealthy neo-
colonial relationship. 
 The introduction and resulting trade 
of Nile perch in Lake Victoria has continued 
a neo-colonial relationship between the core 
(Europe and the Global North) and the 
periphery (Nile perch exporting countries of 
the LVB). In this relationship, the periphery 
is used for resource extraction, in order to 
provide the core with raw goods. The core 
benefits as it receives cheap whitefish 
without experiencing any of the 
environmental, social, or political impacts 
felt by the periphery countries that export 
the fish. In the periphery the emergent novel 
ecology of Lake Victoria has coincided with 
the rise of new social and political dynamics 
for the LVB. These dynamics see greater 
tensions internationally as countries compete 
for a scarcer catch, and domestically as 
communities dependent on the fish deal with 
the reality of dwindling stocks. In the 
periphery the group that faces the greatest 
costs is the marginalized peoples of 
traditional riparian fishing villages. 
                                                 
93 Andrew Muhammad. "Importer Oligopsony Power 
in the EU: The Case of Tanzanian Chilled Fillet 
Exports.” Southwestern Economic Review 35 (2011): 
164. 
94 Richard Ogutu-Ohwayo. "Reproductive potential 
of the Nile perch, Lates niloticus L. and the 
establishment of the species in Lakes Kyoga and 
Victoria (East Africa)." Hydrobiologia 162, no. 3 
(1988): 193. 
Traditional riparian fishing communities of 
the LVB continue to experience malnutrition 
as their food travels elsewhere to meet the 
nutritional needs higher paying consumers. 
The introduction of the Nile perch occurred 
during an era of colonialism and its effects 
today are cyclical and continue a pattern of 
neocolonialism. This is seen as poverty, 
malnutrition, dependency occur in the 
periphery to serve and benefit the markets in 
the core with more capital.  
 
II. The Changing Ecology of Lake 
Victoria 
 
 The introduction of the Nile perch 
into Lake Victoria radically altered the 
lake’s ecology. The ecology of Lake 
Victoria is drastically changed, as 
extinctions resulting from the Nile perch 
have perilously reduced the biodiversity of 
the lake. The Nile perch is a near-top level 
predator where the only effective measure to 
limit to population growth is through human 
controls. The Nile perch is so successful 
because it is a prolific breeder, with females 
producing up to 16 million eggs per year.94 
This rapid rate of reproduction has 
fundamentally altered the trophic web of the 
world’s second largest freshwater lake.95  It 
is estimated that the haplochromine biomass 
of Lake Victoria was reduced from 80% of 
the lake’s total to less than 1% of the lake’s 
total biomass after the introduction of the 
Nile perch. It is also estimated that around 
40% of the lake’s haplochromine species are 
95 Richard O. Abila, and Eirik G. Jansen. "From local 
to global markets. The fish exporting and fishmeal 
industries of Lake Victoria: structure, strategies and 
socio-economic impacts in Kenya." (1997): 1. (The 
total surface area of Lake Victoria is 26,590 miles ² it 
is split between three countries with Tanzania 
possessing 49% of the Lake, Uganda 45% and Kenya 
6%. It is the second largest freshwater lake in the 
world by surface area behind only North America’s 
Lake Superior with 31,700 miles ².) 
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now extinct.96 Many authorities believe this 
is the largest extinction event of vertebrates 
seen in twentieth century. While the Nile 
perch affected habitats for a variety of 
species, trophic cascades have emerged in 
the lake’s ecosystem allowing for the 
proliferation of other species. The reduction 
of haplochromine species reduced 
competition for zooplankton allowing the 
freshwater shrimp (Caridina nilotica) and 
the silver cyprinid (Rastrineobola argentea) 
to flourish.97 This boom in shrimp and silver 
cyprinids led to a rise in aviary predators 
such as pied kingfishers (Ceryle rudis). 
 Under a political ecology 
framework, one deduces that the field of 
‘invasion biology’ is built upon an 
assumption that a past condition should be 
restored, as the current condition is flawed.98 
This lake moved towards a new equilibrium, 
establishing a novel food web. Attempts to 
restore Lake Victoria to an idealized past are 
often misguided because it is impossible to 
restore the former state of the lake due to the 
extinctions which have occurred, and the 
significant costs burden which would be 
incurred to eliminate the Nile perch. 
Furthermore, humans are not always the best 
managers of nature and any attempts to 
restore Lake Victoria’s past may bring about 
more harm than benefit.99 This may be the 
case as conservation efforts to establish a 
healthy ecosystem may be detrimental to the 
inhabitants of the LVB who rely on the fish 
to support their livelihoods when economic 
                                                 
96 Frans Witte et al. "Species extinction and 
concomitant ecological changes in Lake 
Victoria." Netherlands Journal of Zoology 42, no. 2 
(1991): 214. 
97 Robert M. Pringle "From Daniel Simberloff and 
Marcel Rejmánek, editors, Encyclopedia of 
Biological Invasions, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2011." International 
Journal of Pest Management 49: 486. 
98 Paul Robbins and Sarah Moore. "Ecological 
anxiety disorder: diagnosing the politics of the 
and political considerations are taken into 
account.   
 Capitalism still makes use of the 
novel ecology in order to meet Nile perch 
export demand from abroad. The biggest 
international importer is the Global North 
and, more specifically, the European Union 
(EU). In Europe, the Nile perch emerged as 
a popular whitefish that replaced imports of 
cod beginning in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Despite its popularity, the existence of the 
Nile perch leads to the depletion of smaller 
fish such as the haplochromine. The 
depletion of species occurs as Nile perch 
consume haplochromine at rapid rates or 
out-compete cichlids with pharyngeal jaws 
which prey on other fish.100 This is 
consequential for the traditional fishing 
communities in the LVB that have long 
relied on haplochromine as a conventional 
source of food. Parallels can be seen 
between the situation in the LVB and the 
capitalist exploitation which results from the 
cultivation of narcotics in tropical climates. 
The cultivation of coca in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru serves 
as cash crop which brings economic benefits 
to those who produce it for export. However 
the production of such drugs has the 
negative externalities of driving the price of 
the commodity higher which prevents the 
traditional Andean cultures that have 
historically used the plant from accessing it. 
Furthermore the production of coca has a 
tremendous ecological cost as its production 
Anthropocene." cultural geographies 20, no. 1 
(2013): 4. 
99 Paul Robbins. “Whose Ecosystem Is It Anyway.” 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Accessed August 
1, 2017. 
http://faculty.nelson.wisc.edu/robbins/research/. 
100 McGee, Matthew D., Samuel R. Borstein, Russell 
Y. Neches, Heinz H. Buescher, Ole Seehausen, and 
Peter C. Wainwright. "A Pharyngeal Jaw 
Evolutionary Innovation Facilitated Extinction in 
Lake Victoria Cichlids." Science 350, no. 6264 
(2015): 1077-1079. 
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results in the clearing of forests which 
destroys the biodiversity inherent in native 
ecosystems.101  The destruction of habitats 
precludes both humans and wildlife from 
accessing resources they have historically 
relied on in the ecosystem.  
 
III. The Destruction of Traditional 
Riparian Fishing Villages  
 
 Traditional fishing communities that 
surround Lake Victoria face severe negative 
externalities from the policy of Nile perch 
introduction. The quality of life in these 
villages declined with the depletion of the 
haplochromine. Traditional fishing LVB 
communities are highly susceptible to 
malnutrition, and post-Nile perch 
introduction saw an increase in 
malnourishment rates among LVB 
communities. In Kenya’s LVB region 30% 
of children experienced stunted growth and 
15% of children were underweight. In 
Uganda the figures climb to 45.5% of 
children experiencing stunted growth and 
23% of children being underweight. Further 
metrics are alarming as 60% of all deaths of 
children under the age of five in the LVB 
come from malnutrition102 and 5.7% of 
mothers at LVB fish landing sites suffered 
from chronic malnourishment.103 Despite 
high rates of poverty and malnourishment 
individuals from these communities do not 
consume Nile perch often for a range of 
social and economic reasons. First there is 
                                                 
101, Liliana M. Dávalos, Adriana C. Bejarano, 
et al. "Forests and Drugs: Coca-Driven 
Deforestation in Tropical Biodiversity 
Hotspots." Environmental Science & Technology 45, 
no. 4 (2011): 1220. 
102 Diana M. Sabwa Karanja. "Health, Diseases, and 
Nutrition in the Lake Victoria basin." 2006 30197 
(2006): 18-19. 
103 Kim Geheb et al. "Nile perch and the hungry of 
Lake Victoria: Gender, status and food in an East 
African fishery." Food Policy 33, no. 1 (2008): 91. 
often a disdain for the taste of the fish as the 
local communities preferred the 
haplochromine that was consumed for 
generations before the introduction of the 
Nile perch.104 Secondly, Nile perch are 
difficult to catch through traditional fishing 
methods. Nile perch often destroy traditional 
fishing basket traps and consume the fisher’s 
catches of smaller fish.105 Other traditional 
methods used such as beach fishing with 
small size netting of less than 5 inches have 
come under fire by LVB governments and 
were banned in Tanzania in an effort to 
protect juvenile Nile perch.106 The final 
reason Nile perch is rarely consumed locally 
is because it is too valuable to consume and 
instead it is typically reserved for the export 
market where it will fetch a higher price. 
Nile perch is exported to meet the nutritional 
needs of consumers in the Global North, and 
cities in the Global South. In this scenario, 
LVB communities struggle with 
malnutrition while fish with the ability to 
meet their nutritional requirements are 
exported to people who have the ability to 
pay a higher price for the fish. 
Traditional fishing community needs in the 
LVB are ignored by the government’s 
policies. Communities with nutritional 
deficiencies have resorted to fishing for 
silver cyprinid, which puts a strain on the 
species as immature fish have a reduced 
opportunity to grow and reproduce. As a 
result of this strain Kenya implemented a 
yearly two-month fishing ban on silver 
104 Robert M. Pringle. "The Nile perch in Lake 
Victoria: local responses and adaptations." Africa 75, 
no. 4 (2005): 515. 
105 T.O. Acere "The controversy over Nile 
perch." Lates niloticus(1988): 4. 
106 Mwanza Special Correspondent. “Overfishing 
sounds death knell for Nile perch in Lake Victoria.” 
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cyprinid fishing under the Kenya Marine 
and Fisheries Resources Institute (KEMFRI) 
with hope that stocks will rebound.107 This 
ban restricts the nutritional needs of 
traditional fishing communities limiting 
often the only source of protein these 
communities have. Organizations such as 
the African Centre for Technology and 
Science (ACTS) and the IUCN agreed that 
current laws and policies enforced by 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda are poorly 
adapted to the needs and challenges 
traditional fishing LVB communities face.108 
The LVB faces the highest rates of poverty 
in comparison to other areas in Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda. In 1994 the Kenya’s 
Welfare Monitoring Survey found alarming 
rates of “hard core” poverty or a total 
expenditure of less than 703 Kenyan 
shillings per month (approximately $7 USD) 
in the LVB.109 Hard core poverty was 
between 40-50% in three Lake Basin 
districts110 and between 30-40% in four 
other districts.111 The governments that 
surround Lake Victoria continue to 
marginalize these communities through 
policies that incentivize and protect 
commercial fishers. The benefits the 
government receives as the result of bilateral 
trade, licensing, and tax revenues from 
commercial fishing come at the direct 
expense of traditional fishing communities. 
In order to increase the windfall from 
commercial fishing LVB governments 
                                                 
107 Rushdie Oudia. "Dagaa business thrives despite 
ban." The Standard (Kenya), April 14, 2013. 
Accessed August 03, 2017. 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000081607
/dagaa-business-thrives-despite-ban. 
108 “Lake Victoria community takes issue with 
fishing ban.” Panapress. April 3, 2002. Accessed 
August 1, 2017. http://www.panapress.com/Lake-
Victoria-community-takes-issue-with-fishing-ban--
13-457494-17-lang1-index.html. 
109 Eric Odada, Daniel Olago, and Washington 
Ochola. Environment for Development: An 
Ecosystems Assessment of Lake Victoria Basin 
Environmental and Socio-Economic Status, Trends 
encouraged greater mechanization such as 
the use of boats with outboard motors112. 
However, greater mechanization actually 
leads to more poverty for LVB 
communities, which is seen first-hand with 
Tanzania’s neighbor, Zambia.  
Zambia’s Mweru-Luapula fishery has seen 
an increase of poverty within small-scale 
inland fishing communities as the result of 
increased catch rates and fishery 
exploitation. The cause of poverty in these 
communities occurs as greater 
mechanization increases exploitation levels 
in order to compete with largescale fishers 
with advanced technological inputs. The 
increased exploitation is difficult to sustain 
over long periods of time especially when 
the communities face greater population 
pressures.113 The communities that are 
deeply integrated in the fish trade do not see 
economic improvement within their 
communities or reductions in poverty. This 
occurs because funds are reinvested in the 
fishing industry rather than the community. 
This leads to a lower potential for long-term 
economic development as many youths 
decide to forgo school to enter the fishing 
industry. Despite the economic gains from 
fishing sustainable structural development 
has failed to occur in the LVB; the LVB 
supports nearly 28 million of the poorest 
rural inhabitants in the world where over 21 
million people subsist on an income of 
around US$ 90-270 per annum a figure less 
and Human Vulnerabilities. Pan African START 
Secretariat (PASS), (2006): 139. 
110 Ibid. Districts include: Bungoma, Busia, and 
Kericho.  
111 Ibid. Districts include: Bomet, Nyamira, Vihiga, 
and Kakamega. 
112 G. Atukunda and M. Ahmed. "Analysis of 
incentives and disincentives for fish in Uganda." 
FAO Technical notes Series (2012): 14. 
113 Bram Verelst. "Managing Inequality: The Political 
Ecology of a Small-Scale Fishery, Mweru-Luapula, 
Zambia." Journal of Political Ecology 20 (2013): 14-
36. 
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than the dollar-a-day rule used by the World 
Bank.114 Much of the Basin lacks access to 
clean running water, jobs, housing, social 
services, health services, and education 
which have been shown to play a decisive 
role in poverty reduction. LVB communities 
have become dependent on the Nile perch 
fishery115 — by 2000 the Nile perch along 
with two other fish the Nile tilapia 
(Oreochromis niloticus) and the silver 
cyprinid (Rastrineobola argentea) 
constituted 99% of Lake Victoria’s total 
fishery. In the LVB a monoculture has 
emerged focused on the Nile perch. 
Earnings from the late 1970s increased from 
approximately $1 million USD to $260 
million USD in 2000 with 90% of the 
earnings coming from Nile perch export.116 
The traditional LVB communities feel the 
burden of environmental and economic 
consequences as the result of Nile perch 
introduction. This is because large amounts 
of traditional fishing methods are banned or 
are ineffective since fish stocks have been 
depleted by either the Nile perch or 
commercial fishers. These marginalized 
communities suffer the most as a direct 
consequence of Nile perch consumption 
elsewhere. 
 
IV. Commercial fishing is a losing 
proposition in Lake Victoria 
 
The industrial fisheries that profit from Nile 
perch are only benefitting from the 
                                                 
114 Odada, Olago, and Ochola. Environment for 
Development, 139.  
115 Martin van der Knaap and Willem Ligtvoet. "Is 
Western consumption of Nile perch from Lake 
Victoria sustainable?." Aquatic Ecosystem Health & 
Management 13, no. 4 (2010): 430. 
116 Pringle, Encyclopedia of Biological Invasions, 
486. 
117 Erick Kabendera. “Tanzania lobbies Kenya, 
Uganda to impose ban on fishing of Nile.” The East 
African. October 18, 2014. Accessed August 3, 2017. 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Tanzania-
profitability of their endeavors in the short 
run when their policies will lead to a 
fisheries collapse and a long term collapse 
of the supporting food web. Commercial 
fishing has blossomed into a very lucrative 
industry with an economy of agglomeration 
that surrounds the catch of the Nile perch. In 
2014, Nile perch exports from LVB were 
estimated to be $325 Million USD; and in 
Uganda, fish is the country’s second biggest 
export behind coffee.117 The demand for 
Nile perch is increasing abroad in places 
such as South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, the 
Middle East, Europe, Australia, the United 
States, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. In this case, it appears that the Nile 
perch is a winning proposition. It is, 
however, losing because large amounts of 
the population and economy are overly 
dependent on the fish. The Nile perch’s 
profitability led to its exploitation from 
overfishing and is ultimately leading it 
toward its decline. Nile perch biomass 
steadily decreased in August 1999 from 1.9 
million tonnes (82% of Lake Victoria 
Biomass) to 227,000 tonnes (14.9% of Lake 
Victoria biomass) in August 2008118 More 
fishers continue to enter the market hoping 
to capitalize on the Nile perch boom that 
began in the 1980s.119 With the decline of 
the Nile perch, a decline in the livelihoods 
of individuals involved in the fishing 
industry occurs. The economy of the LVB is 
so dependent on fish exports that a collapse 
of the fishing industry would increase the 
lobbies- Kenya--Uganda-to-ban-fishing-Nile-
Perch/2560-2490758-13dtsu1/index.html. 
118Robert Kayanda et al. "Status of the major 
commercial fish stocks and proposed species-specific 
management plans for Lake Victoria." African 
Journal of Tropical Hydrobiology and Fisheries 21 
(2009): 16. 
119 Geheb et al. 2008, P.87 (In 1983 Lake Victoria 
contained an estimated 12,041 fishing vessels and in 
2004 Lake Victoria contained an estimated 51,712 
fishing vessels.)  
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region’s already staggering poverty rates 
where 50% or more basin residents fall 
below the their respective countries national 
poverty lines.120 Many within the fishing 
industry do not have a formal education and 
their employment prospects outside of 
fishing are limited. The other major 
employment opportunity in the LVB is that 
of sand mining. Sand mining has very 
negative externalities including increasing 
bank erosion, lake pollution, and further 
harming the Lake’s fishery by destroying 
fish spawning grounds.121 Lake Victoria’s 
industrial fishers are at a loss because there 
is very high investment in the fishery with 
returns that see annual decreases. The 
fisherman have secured some wealth from 
the fishing boom but if the fishery collapses 
there is little economic opportunities outside 
of commercial fishing. Furthermore this 
investment in the fishing industry has 
resulted in the lost opportunity cost of 
investing and developing industries in the 
LVB that would have led to long term 
sustainable growth.  
Lake Victoria’s border countries are in a 
poor position because of their involvement 
with commercial industrial fisheries. The 
increased competition for Nile perch 
amongst a declining supply is resulting in 
greater tensions amongst countries of the 
LVB. This can be seen in June 2016 with 
Uganda deploying its military forces to 
guard its waters from foreign fishers. This 
                                                 
120 Brent M. Swallow. “Improved Land Management 
in the Lake Victoria Basin: Final report on the 
TransVic project." World Agroforestry Centre 
(2006): 1. 
121 Nyakeya Kobingi et al. "Assessment of pollution 
impacts on the ecological integrity of the Kisian and 
Kisat rivers in Lake Victoria drainage basin, 
Kenya." African Journal of Environmental Science 
and Technology 3, no. 4 (2009): 97. 
122 Mel Frykberg. “Ugandan military guards Lake 
Victoria's dwindling fish stocks.” IOL. March 13, 
2017. Accessed August 1, 2017. 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/ugandan-military-
guards-lake-victorias-dwindling-fish-stocks-8171045. 
has increased tensions around the disputed 
Mingingo Island with Kenya that could 
potentially escalate into a greater conflict.122 
Declining fish stocks have forced a response 
from the East Africa Community (EAC)123 
to launch the Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Management Plan III (FMP III) 2016-2020. 
The goal of FMP III is the “Recovery of 
biomass of Nile perch with Sustainable 
utilisation of fisheries resources of Lake 
Victoria basin with equitable opportunities 
and benefits.”124 This is a step forward, but 
multilateral agreements to stop 
unsustainable fishing are difficult to achieve 
or are unsuccessful. FMP III has the goal to 
allow the Nile perch to rebound, however it 
is still not clear if this approach will be 
successful. If the approach is successful, it 
would continue the marginalization of the 
LVB traditional fishing villages and further 
destroy the haplochromine by limiting their 
opportunity to rebound.125 If the Nile perch 
fishery collapses, the multimillion dollar 
industry it supports will follow. This will 
ultimately harm the people and governments 
of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. If 
measures to preserve the fish are successful, 
some of the regions most marginalized 
people will continue to be oppressed as 
government policies, strong commercial 
fishing, and a Nile perch rebound will 
suppress their traditional food sources.  
 
123 EAC partner countries include Kenya, Burundi, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania 
124 “Fisheries Management Plan III (FMP III) for 
Lake Victoria fisheries launched in Arusha.” East 




125 Many species of haplochromine have begun to 
rebound with lower number of Nile perch which 
includes some species such as Neochromis simotes 
that experts once believed was extinct but has now 
reappeared (Balirwa et al. 2001, P. 4,22) 
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V. The Winner from Nile Perch 
Introduction  
 
While there have been many who have lost 
from the introduction of the Nile perch into 
Lake Victoria, there are major beneficiaries 
from the policy: the Global North and, most 
notably, the EU. Around 80% of the Nile 
perch harvest is processed and exported 
primarily to Europe, Asia, Israel, the Middle 
East, and the United States126. The EU is the 
primary consumer of Nile perch. In 2004, 
exports to the EU totaled €190 million ($224 
Million USD).127 European demand for the 
fish is flexible as they can purchase 
whitefish from elsewhere such as Central 
Asia if Nile perch prices are too high. In this 
situation, Europe has leverage to force low 
prices on Nile perch exports. In order to 
remain competitive fish prices are lowered, 
in this situation fillets still remain too 
expensive for LVB inhabitants and less 
foreign money comes to the LVB.128 This 
stifles the LVB’s economic development, as 
there is not enough capital to develop 
industries outside fishing. This directly 
continues a core-periphery colonial legacy 
where the core intentionally keeps the 
periphery weak for its benefit.  
The EU is in a unique win-win position 
when it comes to the Nile perch. If the Nile 
perch collapses, the EU has the ability to 
claim they helped reduce the fallout from 
one of the world’s worst ‘invasive’ species. 
As consumer purchasing power reduced 
Nile perch prevalence mitigating against the 
disruption to the food web caused by the 
fish. If the fishery collapses, it will buy 
                                                 
126 Jennifer Lee Johnson. "From Mfangano to 
Madrid: the global commodity chain for 
Kenyan Nile perch." Aquatic Ecosystem Health 
& Management 13, no. 1 (2010): 22. 
127Helga Josupeit. The Market for Nile Perch. FAO 
Globefish Research Programme, (2006): 43. 
128 “Nile Perch Fillet Subsector Study In Lake Zone a 
Quick Scan” SNV Netherlands Development 
whitefish from elsewhere, as it did when the 
Atlantic northwest cod fishery collapsed. If 
the fishery recovers, the EU has a cheap 
source of whitefish and can tell the story that 
they are helping the economic development 
of the LVB by purchasing the fish. The 
periphery does not have these options as 
their dependency is evident: 90% of 
Tanzania’s fish exports are Nile perch.129 
This is a continuing of the core-periphery 
problem where the Global North is forcing 
the Global South dependency and exploiting 
its resources without taking into account the 
breadth of consequences Nile perch 
consumption has for the LVB. 
 
VI. Lake Victoria’s Catch-22 
 
While Europe and the Global North have a 
win-win situation, the LVB is stuck in a 
catch-22. Much of the rhetoric from Global 
North environmentalists is focused on the 
removal of the fish because of its ‘invasive’ 
status. This mindset is divorced from the 
reality of the situation occurring in the LVB 
where many communities are dependent on 
the fish. This leads to a catch-22 where the 
LVB is stuck in a losing proposition no 
matter what the outcome is. If the Nile perch 
continues its presence in the lake, the lake 
could see a decline of more fish species and 
likely more extinction, further harming 
marginalized LVB traditional fishing 
communities. If the fish is eliminated, a 
lucrative industry will collapse as the Nile 
perch represents the vast market share of 
fish that is exported (90%) from the LVB. 
Other Lake species including silver 
Organisation: Tanzania, November 2005, 7. 




129 Jennie Bergman and Sandra Vieweg. "Nile Perch 
Export and Welfare around Lake Victoria-Has the 
boom in exports been positive for welfare?." 
(2012):7. 
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cyprinids and cichlids do not have a large 
export profile outside of Africa. The only 
other remaining fish that is prominent in the 
export market is the non-native Nile tilapia 
which may face more pressure whose 
population has been steadily increasing with  
 
 
Nile perch declines.130 The dependency on 
Nile perch monoculture and the reliance on 
Global North consumption of the fish serve 
as a precursor to a catastrophic situation. In 
this situation large numbers of individuals 
with little prospects outside fishing will lose 
work and many may elect enter the sand 
mining trade – which presents other 
significant environmental hazards to Lake 
Victoria. Governments will see a decrease in 
trade and tax revenue, hampering future 
development. Ultimately, the African 
countries that surround Lake Victoria are in 
a catch-22 with losing options, while the 
Global North is locked into a win-win 
situation. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
The current focus of the Lake Victoria 
debate is to reduce stocks of Nile perch in 
order to return the Lake to its old ecology, or 
to improve Nile perch stocks continuing the 
viability of commercial fishing. Both sides 
are misguided as they do nothing remedy the 
groups most marginalized by the policy of 
Nile perch introduction. The focus does not 
address the neo-colonial relationship 
between the Global North and South which 
is a driver of dependency, poverty, 
malnutrition, lack of sustainable 
development, and increased conflict among 
riparian communities in the LVB. Future 
debates on the subject from both the Global 
North and South need to incorporate the 
                                                 
130 M. Njiru, J. Ojuok, A. Getabu, et al. "Increasing 
Dominance of Nile Tilapia, Oreochromis niloticus 
(L) in Lake Victoria, Kenya: Consequences for the 
social, political, and economic impacts 
policies will have on some of the world’s 
poorest rural inhabitants. Conservation 
efforts designed and implemented with 
ecosystem health as a primary goal should 
aim to incorporate sustainable development 
principles from the fishery’s wealth to 
improve access to clean running water, 
alternative jobs, housing, education, and 
health and social services for LVB residents. 
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